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Fully distributed Nash equilibrium seeking over time-varying
communication networks with linear convergence rate
Mattia Bianchi and Sergio Grammatico
Abstract— We design a distributed algorithm for learning
Nash equilibria over time-varying communication networks in
a partial-decision information scenario, where each agent can
access its own cost function and local feasible set, but can
only observe the actions of some neighbors. Our algorithm is
based on projected pseudo-gradient dynamics, augmented with
consensual terms. Under strong monotonicity and Lipschitz
continuity of the game mapping, we provide a simple proof
of linear convergence, based on a contractivity property of the
iterates. Compared to similar solutions proposed in literature,
we also allow for time-varying communication and derive
tighter bounds on the step sizes that ensure convergence. In
fact, in our numerical simulations, our algorithm outperforms
the existing gradient-based methods, when the step sizes are
set to their theoretical upper bounds. Finally, to relax the
assumptions on the network structure, we propose a different
pseudo-gradient algorithm, which is guaranteed to converge on
time-varying balanced directed graphs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nash equilibrium (NE) problems arise in several network
systems, where multiple selfish decision-makers, or agents,
aim at optimizing their individual, yet inter-dependent, objec-
tive functions. Engineering applications include communica-
tion networks [1], demand-side management in the smart grid
[2], charging of electric vehicles [3] and demand response in
competitive markets [4]. From a game-theoretic perspective,
the challenge is to assign the agents behavioral rules that
eventually ensure the attainment of a NE, a joint action from
which no agent has an incentive to unilaterally deviate.
Literature review: Typically, NE seeking algorithms are
designed under the assumption that each agent can access
the decisions of all the competitors [5], [6], [7]. This full-
decision information hypothesis requires the presence of a
coordinator, that broadcast the data to the network, and it
is impractical for some applications [8], [9]. One example
is the Nash-Cournot competition model described in [10],
where the profit of each of a group of firms depends
not only on its own production, but also on the whole
amount of sales, a quantity not directly accessible by any
of the firms. Therefore, in recent years, there has been
an increased attention for fully distributed algorithms that
allow to compute NEs relying on local information only.
In this paper, we consider the so-called partial-decision in-
formation scenario, where the agents engage in nonstrategic
information exchange with some neighbors on a network;
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based on the data received, they can estimate and eventually
reconstruct the actions of all the competitors. This setup
has only been introduced very recently. In particular, most
of the results available resort to (projected) gradient and
consensus dynamics, both in continuous time [11], [12],
and discrete time. For the discrete time case, fixed-step
algorithms were proposed in [13], [14], [15] (the latter
for generalized games), all exploiting a certain restricted
monotonicity property. Alternatively, the authors of [16]
developed a gradient-play scheme by leveraging contractivity
properties of doubly stochastic matrices. Nevertheless, in all
these approaches theoretical guarantees are provided only for
step sizes that are typically very small, affecting the speed of
convergence. Furthermore, all the methods cited are designed
for a time-invariant, undirected network. To the best of our
knowledge, switching communication topologies have only
been addressed with diminishing step sizes. For instance,
the early work [10] considered aggregative games over time-
varying jointly connected undirected graphs. This result was
extended by the authors of [17] to games with coupling
constraints. In [18], an asynchronous gossip algorithm was
presented to seek a NE over directed graphs. The drawback
is that vanishing steps typically result in slow convergence.
Contribution: Motivated by the above, in this paper we
present the first fixed-step NE seeking algorithms for strongly
monotone games over time-varying communication net-
works. Our novel contributions are summarized as follows:
• We propose a fully distributed projected gradient-play
method, that is guaranteed to converge with linear rate
when the network adjacency matrix is doubly stochastic.
With respect to [16], we consider a time-varying commu-
nication network and we allow for constrained action sets.
Moreover, differently from the state of the art, we provide
an upper bound on the step size that does not vanish as
the number of agents increases (III);
• We show via numerical simulations that, even in the case
of fixed networks, our algorithm outperforms the existing
pseudo-gradient based dynamics, when the step sizes are
set to their theoretical upper bounds (V);
• We prove that linear convergence to a NE on time-varying
weight-balanced directed graphs can be achieved via a
forward-backward algorithm [19, 12.7.2], which has been
studied in [15], [14], but only for the special case of fixed
undirected networks (IV).
Basic notation: N is the set of natural numbers, including
0. R is the set of real numbers. 0n (1n) denotes the vector of
dimension n with all elements equal to 0 (1); In the identity
matrix of dimension n; the subscripts might be omitted
when there is no ambiguity. For a matrix A ∈ Rm×n, A⊤
denotes its transpose; [A]i,j is the element on row i and
column j, and the second subscript is omitted if n = 1;
σmin(A) = σ1(A) ≤ · · · ≤ σn(A) =: σmax(A) = ‖A‖
denote its singular values. If A ∈ Rn×n, det(A) is its
determinant; A ≻ 0 stands for symmetric positive definite
matrix; if A is symmetric, λmin(A) = λ1(A) ≤ · · · ≤
λn(A) =: λmax(A) denote its eigenvalues. ⊗ denotes the
Kronecker product. diag(A1, . . . , AN ) denotes the block
diagonal matrix with A1, . . . , AN on its diagonal. Given N
vectors x1, . . . , xN , x := col (x1, . . . , xN ) = [x
⊤
1 . . . x
⊤
N ]
⊤
and x−i = col(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xN ). ‖ · ‖ denotes
the Euclidean vector norm. For a differentiable function
g : Rn → R, ∇xg(x) denotes its gradient. A mapping A :
R
m → Rn is ℓ-Lipschitz continuous if, for any x, y ∈ Rm,
‖A(x) − A(y)‖ ≤ ℓ‖x − y‖. projS : Rn → S denotes
the Euclidean projection onto a closed convex set S. An
operator F : Rn → Rn is (µ-strongly) monotone if, for any
x, y ∈ Rn, (F(x)−F(y))⊤(x− y) ≥ 0 (≥ µ‖x− y‖2). The
variational inequality VI(F , S) is the problem of finding a
vector x∗ ∈ S such that F(x∗)⊤(x−x∗) ≥ 0, for all x ∈ S.
II. MATHEMATICAL SETUP
We consider a set of agents I := {1, . . . , N}, where
each agent i ∈ I shall choose its action (i.e., decision
variable) xi from its local decision set Ωi ⊆ Rni . Let
x = col((xi)i∈I) ∈ Ω denote the stacked vector of all the
agents’ decisions, Ω = Ω1×· · ·×ΩN ⊆ Rn the overall action
space and n :=
∑N
i=1 ni. The goal of each agent i ∈ I is to
minimize its objective function Ji(xi, x−i), which depends
on both the local variable xi and the decision variables of
the other agents x−i = col((xj)j∈I\{i}). The game is then
represented by the inter-dependent optimization problems:
∀i ∈ I : argmin
yi∈Ωi
Ji(yi, x−i). (1)
The technical problem we consider in this paper is the
computation of a NE, as defined next.
Definition 1: A Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies
x∗ = col ((x∗i )i∈N ) ∈ Ω such that, for all i ∈ I:
Ji
(
x∗i , x
∗
−i
) ≤ inf{Ji (yi, x∗−i) | yi ∈ Ωi}.
The following regularity assumptions are common for NE
problems, see, e.g., [15, Ass. 1], [14, Ass. 1].
Standing Assumption 1 (Regularity and convexity): For
each i ∈ I, the set Ωi is non-empty, closed and convex;
Ji is continuous and the function Ji (·, x−i) is convex and
continuously differentiable for every x−i.
Under Standing Assumption 1, a joint action x∗ is a NE
of the game in (1) if and only if it solves the variational
inequality VI(F,Ω) [19, Prop. 1.4.2], or, equivalently, if and
only if, for any α > 0 [19, Prop. 1.5.8],
x∗ = projΩ(x
∗ − αF (x∗)), (2)
where F is the pseudo-gradient mapping of the game:
F (x) := col ((∇xiJi(xi, x−i))i∈I) . (3)
Next, we postulate a sufficient condition for the existence of
a unique NE, namely the strong monotonicity of the pseudo-
gradient [19, Th. 2.3.3]. This assumption is always used for
(G)NE seeking under partial-decision information with fixed
step sizes, e.g., in [14, Ass. 2], [15, Ass. 3]. It implies strong
convexity of the functions Ji(·, x−i) for every x−i, but not
necessarily (strong) convexity of Ji in the full argument.
Standing Assumption 2: The pseudo-gradient mapping in
(3) is µ-strongly monotone and ℓ0-Lipschitz continuous, for
some µ, ℓ0 > 0.
In our setup, each agent i can only access its own cost
function Ji and feasible set Ωi. Moreover, agent i does
not have full knowledge of x−i, and only relies on the
information exchanged locally with neighbors over a time-
varying directed communication network Gk(I, Ek). The
ordered pair (i, j) belongs to the set of edges, Ek, if and only
if agent i can receive information from agent j at time k. Let
Wk ∈ RN×N denote the weighted adjacency matrix of Gk,
and wki,j := [Wk]i,j , with w
k
i,j > 0 if (i, j) ∈ Ek, wki,j = 0
otherwise; Dk = diag((d
k
i )i∈I) and Lk = Dk −Wk the in-
degree and Laplacian matrices of Gk, with dki =
∑N
j=1 w
k
i,j ;
N ki = {j | (i, j) ∈ Ek} the set of in-neighbors of agent i.
Standing Assumption 3: For each k ∈ N, the graph Gk is
strongly connected.
Assumption 1: For all k ∈ N, the following hold:
(i) Self-loops: wki,i > 0 for all i ∈ I;
(ii) Double stochasticity: Wk1N = 1N , 1
⊤
NWk = 1
⊤
N .
Remark 1: Assumption 1(i) is intended just to ease the
notation. Instead, Assumption 1(ii) is stronger. It is typi-
cally used for networked problems on undirected symmetric
graphs, e.g., in [10, Ass. 6], [17, Ass. 3], [16, Ass. 3],
justified by the fact that it can be satisfied by assigning the
following Metropolis weights to the communication:
w˜ki,j =


wki,j/(max{dki , dkj }+ 1) if j ∈ Ni\{i};
0 if j /∈ Ni;
1−∑j∈Ni\{i} w˜ki,j if i = j.
In practice, to satisfy Assumption 1(ii) in case of symmetric
communication, even under time-varying topology, it suffices
for the agents to exchange their in-degree with their neigh-
bors at every time step. Therefore, Standing Assumption 3
and Assumption 1 are easily fulfilled for undirected graphs
connected at each step. For directed graphs, given any
strongly connected topology, weights can be assigned such
that the resulting adjacency matrix (with self-loops) is doubly
stochastic, via an iterative distributed process [20]. However,
this can be impractical if the network is time-varying.
Under Assumption 1, it holds that σN−1(Wk) < 1, for
all k, where σN−1(Wk) denotes the second largest singular
value of Wk. Moreover, for any y ∈ RN ,
‖Wk(y − 1N y¯)‖ ≤ σN−1(Wk)‖y − 1N y¯‖, (4)
where y¯ = 1
N
1
⊤
Ny is the average of y. We will further assume
that σN−1(Wk) is bounded away from 1; this automatically
holds if the networks Gk are chosen among a finite family.
Assumption 2: There exists σ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that
σN−1(Wk) ≤ σ¯, for all k ∈ N.
III. DISTRIBUTED NASH EQUILIBRIUM SEEKING
In this section, we present a pseudo-gradient algorithm to
seek a NE of the game (1) in a fully distributed way. To cope
with partial-decision information, each agent keeps an esti-
mate of all other agents’ actions. Let xi = col((xi,j)j∈I) ∈
R
Nn, where xi,i := xi and xi,j is agent i’s estimate of agent
j’s action, for all j 6= i; also, xj,−i = col((xj,l)l∈I\{i}). The
agents aim at asymptotically reconstructing the true value of
the opponents’ actions, based on the data received from their
neighbors. The procedure is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Each agent updates its estimates according to consensus
dynamics, then its action via a gradient step. We remark
that each agent computes the partial gradient of its cost in
its local estimates xi, not on the actual joint action x.
To write the algorithm in compact form, let x =
col((xi)i∈I); as in [15, Eq. 13-14], let, for all i ∈ I,
Ri :=
[
0ni×n<i Ini 0ni×n>i
] ∈ Rni×n, (5)
where n<i :=
∑i−1
j=1 nj , n>i :=
∑N
j=i+1 nj ; let also R :=
diag ((Ri)i∈I) ∈ Rn×Nn. In simple terms, Ri selects the i-
th ni dimensional component from an n-dimensional vector.
Thus, Rixi = xi,i = xi, and x = Rx. We define the
extended pseudo-gradient mapping F as
F (x) := col ((∇xiJi (xi,xi,−i))i∈I) . (6)
Therefore, Algorithm 1 reads in compact form as:
xk+1 = projΩ(Wkx
k − αR⊤F (Wkxk)), (7)
where Ω := {x ∈ RNn | Rx ∈ Ω} and Wk := Wk ⊗ In.
Lemma 1 ([21, Lemma 3]): The mapping F in (6) is ℓ-
Lipschitz continuous, for some µ ≤ ℓ ≤ ℓ0.
Theorem 1: Let Assumptions 1-2 hold and let
Mα =

 1− 2αµN + α
2ℓ2
0
N
(
α(ℓ+ℓ0)+α
2ℓ0ℓ√
N
)
σ¯(
α(ℓ+ℓ0)+α
2ℓ0ℓ√
N
)
σ¯
(
1 + 2αℓ+ α2ℓ2
)
σ¯2

 .
(8)
If the step size α > 0 is chosen such that
ρα := λmax(Mα) = ‖Mα‖ < 1, (9)
then, for any initial condition, the sequence (xk)k∈N gener-
ated by Algorithm 1 converges to x∗ = 1N ⊗ x∗, where x∗
is the NE of the game in (1), with linear rate: for all k ∈ N,
‖xk − x∗‖ ≤ (√ρα) k ‖x0 − x∗‖.
Lemma 2: The condition in (9) holds if α > 0 and
α < σ¯3ℓ0 (10a)
α < 2µ
ℓ2
0
(10b)
0 < 2µ(1− σ¯2)− α(σ¯2(2ℓ0ℓ+ ℓ2 + 4µℓ+ 2ℓ20)− ℓ20)
− α2(ℓ0ℓ2 + µℓ2 + 2ℓ20ℓ)2σ¯2 − α32ℓ20ℓ2σ¯2. (10c)

Proof: The condition in (10a) implies that Mα ≻ 0 (by
diagonal dominance and positivity of the diagonal elements,
as can be checked by recalling that ℓ ≤ ℓ0, µ ≤ ℓ0, N ≥ 2,
σ¯ < 1). The inequalities in (10b)-(10c) are the Sylvester’s
Algorithm 1 Fully distributed NE seeking
Initialization: for all i ∈ I, set x0i ∈ Ωi, x0i,−i ∈ Rn−ni .
Iterate until convergence: for all i ∈ I,
Distributed averaging: xˆ
k
i =
∑N
j=1 w
k
i,jx
k
j
Local variables update: xk+1i = projΩi(xˆ
k
i,i − α∇xiJi(xˆki ))
xk+1i,−i = xˆ
k
i,−i.
criterion for the matrix I2 − Mα: they impose that [I2 −
Mα]1,1 > 0 (10b) and det(I2 −Mα) > 0 (10c), hence I2 −
Mα ≻ 0. Altogether, this implies ‖Mα‖ < 1.
Remark 2: The conditions in (10) always hold for α small
enough, since, in the monomial inequality (10c), the constant
term is 2µ(1− σ¯2) > 0. While explicit solutions are known
for cubic equations, we prefer the compact representation
in (10c). The bounds in (10) are not tight, and in practice
better bounds on the step size α are obtained by simply
checking the Euclidean norm of the 2× 2 matrix Mα in (8).
Instead, the key observation is that the conditions in (10) do
not depend on the number of agents: given the parameters
σ¯, µ, ℓ0 and ℓ, a constant α that ensures convergence can be
chosen independently of N . On the contrary, the rate
√
ρα
does depend on N and, in fact, it approaches 1 as N grows
unbounded (analogously to the results in [13], [14], [16]).
Remark 3: Compared to [16, Alg. (7)] (or [14, Alg. 1]), in
Algorithm 1 the agents first exchange information with their
neighbors, and then evaluate their gradient term, resulting in
better bounds on the step size α. Moreover, differently from
[16, Th. 1], Theorem 1 provides a contractivity property for
the iterates in (7) that holds at each step. This has beneficial
consequences in terms of robustness, see Remark 6.
A. Technical discussion
In Algorithm 1, the partial gradients ∇xiJi are evaluated
on the local estimates xi,−i, not on the actual strategies x−i.
Only if the estimates of all the agents coincide with the actual
value, i.e., x = 1N ⊗ x, we have that F (x) = F (x). As a
consequence, the mapping R⊤F is not necessarily mono-
tone, not even under strong monotonicity of the game map-
ping. Indeed, the loss of monotonicity is the main technical
difficulty arising from the partial-decision information setup.
Some works [12], [13], [15], [21] deal with this issue by
leveraging a restricted strong monotonicity property, which
can be ensured, by opportunely choosing the parameter γ, for
the augmented mapping Fa(x) := γR⊤F (x) + Lx, where
L = L⊗In and L is the Laplacian of a fixed undirected con-
nected network. Since the unique solution of the VI(Fa,Ω)
is x∗ = 1N ⊗ x∗, with x∗ the unique NE of the game in
(1) [14, Prop. 1], one can design NE seeking algorithms via
standard solution methods for variational inequalities (or the
corresponding monotone inclusions, [15]). For instance, in
[14], a forward-backward algorithm [19, 12.4.2] is proposed
to solve VI(Fa,Ω), resulting in the algorithm
xk+1 = projΩ
(
xk − τ(Fa(x))
)
. (11)
We also recover this iteration when considering [15, Alg. 1]
in the absence of coupling constraints. However, exploiting
the monotonicity of Fa results in conservative upper bounds
on the parameters τ and γ, and hence in slow convergence
(see IV-V). More recently, the authors of [16] studied the
convergence of (11) based on contractivity of the iterates, in
the case of a fixed undirected network with doubly stochastic
adjacency matrix W , unconstrained action sets (i.e., Ω =
R
n), and by fixing τ = 1, which results in the algorithm:
xk+1 = (W ⊗ IN )x− αR⊤F (xk). (12)
Nonetheless, the upper bound on α provided in [16, Th. 1] is
decreasing to zero when the number of agents N grows un-
bounded (in contrast with that in Theorem 1, see Lemma 2).
IV. BALANCED DIRECTED GRAPHS
In this section, we relax Assumption 1 to the following.
Assumption 3: For all k ∈ N, the communication graph
Gk is weight balanced: (1⊤NWk)⊤ = Wk1N .
For weight-balanced digraphs, in-degree and out-degree
of each node coincide. Therefore, the matrix L˜k := (Lk +
L⊤k )/2 = Dk − (Wk + W⊤k )/2 is itself the symmetric
Laplacian of an undirected graph. Besides, such a graph is
connected by Standing Assumption 3; hence L˜k has a simple
eigenvalue in 0, and the others are positive, i.e., λ2(L˜k) > 0.
Assumption 4: There exist σ˜, λ¯ > 0 such that σmax(Lk) ≤
σ˜ and λ2(L˜k) ≥ λ¯ , for all k ∈ N.
Remark 4: Assumptions 2 and 4 always hold if the net-
works switch among a finite family. Yet, σ¯, σ˜ and λ¯ are
global parameters, that could be difficult to compute in a
distributed way; upper/lower bounds might be available for
special classes of networks, e.g., unweighted graphs.
To seek a NE over switching balanced digraphs, we propose
the iteration in Algorithm 2. In compact form, it reads as
xk+1 = projΩ
(
xk − τ(γR⊤F (xk) +Lkxk)
)
(13)
where Lk = Lk ⊗ In. Clearly, (13) is the same scheme of
(11), just adapted to take the switching topology into account.
In fact, the proof of convergence of Algorithm 2 is based on
a restricted strong monotonicity property of the operator
F
k
a (x) := γR⊤F (x) +Lkx, (14)
that still holds for balanced directed graphs, as we show next.
Theorem 2: Let Assumptions 3-4 hold, and let
M := γ
[
µ
N
− ℓ0+ℓ
2
√
N
− ℓ0+ℓ
2
√
N
λ¯
γ
− θ
]
,
µ¯ := λmin(M),
γmax :=
4µλ¯
(ℓ0+ℓ)2+4µθ
,
ℓ¯ := ℓ+ σ˜
τmax := 2µ¯/ℓ¯
2,
(15)
ργ,τ := 1− 2τµ¯+ τ2ℓ¯2.
If γ ∈ (0, γmax), then M ≻ 0 and, for any τ ∈ (0, τmax),
for any initial condition, the sequence (xk)k∈N generated by
Algorithm 2 converges to x∗ = 1N ⊗ x∗, where x∗ is the
unique NE of the game in (1), with linear rate: for all k ∈ N,
‖xk − x∗‖ ≤ (√ργ,τ) k ‖x0 − x∗‖.
Algorithm 2 Fully distributed NE seeking
Initialization: for all i ∈ I, set x0i ∈ Ωi, x0i,−i ∈ Rn−ni .
Iterate until convergence: for all i ∈ I,
xˆ
k
i =
∑N
j=1 w
k
i,j(x
k
i − xkj )
xk+1i = projΩi
(
xki − τ(γ∇xiJi(xki ) + xˆki,i)
)
xk+1i,−i = xˆ
k
i,−i.
Remark 5: Differently from the bound αmax in (8), τmax
in (15) vanishes as N grows (fixed the other parameters), as
µ¯ decreases to 0 (by continuity of the eigenvalues).
Remark 6: Based on Theorems 1, 2, it can be proven
that the discrete-time systems (7), (13) are input-to-state-
stable (ISS) with respect to additive disturbances, with ISS-
Lyapunov function ‖x − x∗‖2. By Lipschitz continuity of
the updates, this implies ISS for noise both on the commu-
nication and in the evaluation of the partial gradients.
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE: A NASH-COURNOT GAME
We consider the Nash-Cournot game in [15, 6]. N firms
produce a commodity that is sold to m markets. Each firm
i ∈ I = {1, . . . , N} can only participate in ni ≤ m of
the markets; its action xi ∈ Rni is the vector of quantities
of product to be sent to these ni markets, bounded by the
local constraints 0ni ≤ xi ≤ Xi. Let Ai ∈ Rm×ni be the
matrix that specifies which markets firm i participates in.
Specifically, [Ai]k,j = 1 if [xi]j is the amount of product
sent to the k-th market by agent i, [Ai]k,j = 0 otherwise,
for all k = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . , ni. Let A := [A1 . . . AN ];
then Ax =
∑N
i=1 Aixi ∈ Rm are the quantities of total
product delivered to each market. Firm i aims at maximizing
its profit, i.e., minimizing the cost function Ji(xi, x−i) =
ci(xi) − p(Ax)⊤Aixi. Here, ci(xi) = x⊤i Qixi + q⊤i xi is
firm i’s production cost, with Qi ∈ Rni×ni , Qi ≻ 0, qi ∈
R
ni . Instead, p : Rm → Rm associates to each market a
price that depends on the amount of product delivered to
that market. Specifically, the price for the market k, for k =
1, . . . ,m, is [p(Ax)]k = P¯k -χk[Ax]k , where P¯k, χk > 0.
We set N = 20, m = 7. The market structure is as in [15,
Fig. 1], that defines which firms are allowed to participate in
which markets. Therefore, x ∈ Rn, with n = 32. We select
randomly with uniform distribution rk in [1, 2], Qi diagonal
with diagonal elements in [14, 16], qi in [1, 2], P¯k in [10, 20],
χk in [1, 3], Xi in [5, 10], for all i ∈ I, k = 1, . . . ,m. The
resulting setup satisfies Standing Assumptions 1-2 [15, VI].
The firms cannot access the production of all the competitors,
but can communicate with some neighbors on a network.
We first consider the case of a fixed, undirected graph,
under Assumption 1. Algorithm 2 in this case reduces to
[14, Alg. 1]. We compare Algorithms 1-2 with the inexact
ADMM in [13] and the accelerated gradient method in [14],
for the step sizes that ensure convergence. Specifically, we
set α as in Theorem 1 for Algorithm 1. The convergence of
all the other Algorithms is based on the monotonicity of Fa
in (14); hence we set γ as in Theorem 2. Instead of using the
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Fig. 1. Distance from the NE for different pseudo-gradient NE seeking
methods, with step sizes that guarantee convergence.
100 102 104 106
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Fig. 2. Distance from the NE for Algorithm 1, with step size α = 2∗10−3
(upper bound in Theorem 1), and the method in [16, Alg. 1], with step
size α = 4 ∗ 10−6 (upper bound in [16, Th. 1]). Algorithm 1 converges
much faster, thanks to the larger step size. The scheme in [16, Alg. 1] still
converges if we set α = 2∗10−3 (dashed line, not supported theoretically).
conservative bounds in (15) for the parameters, µ¯ and ℓ¯, we
obtain a better result by computing the values numerically.
Fa is (non-restricted) strongly monotone for our parameters,
hence also the convergence result for [14, Alg. 2 ] holds.
Figure 1 shows that Algorithm 1 outperforms all the other
methods (we also note that the accelerated gradient in [14,
Alg. 2] requires two projections and two communications
per iterations). As a numerical example, we also compare
Algorithm 1 with the scheme in (12) by removing the local
constraints, in Figure 2.
For the case of doubly stochastic time-varying networks,
we randomly generate 5 connected graphs and for each
iteration we pick one with uniform distribution. In Figure 3,
we compare the performance of Algorithms 1-2, for step
sizes set to their upper bounds as in Theorems 1-2. Since
the theoretical convergence rate in Theorems 1-2 worsens as
the number of agents grows, to show how the performance
is affected in practice, we repeat the experiment for different
values of N and random market structures (Figure 3).
Finally, in Figure 4, we test Algorithm 2 with communica-
tion topology chosen at each step with uniform distribution
between two unweighted balanced directed graphs: the di-
rected ring, where each agent i can send information to the
agent i + 1 (with the convention N + 1 ≡ 1), and a graph
where agent i is also allowed to transmit to agent i+ 2, for
all i ∈ I.
VI. CONCLUSION
Nash equilibrium problems on time-varying graphs can
be solved with linear rate via fixed-step pseudo-gradient
algorithms, if the network is connected at every iteration
and the game mapping is Lipschitz continuous and strongly
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Fig. 3. Comparison of Algorithms 1 and 2, on a time-varying graph, for 20,
50 or 100 agents, with the step sizes set to their theoretical upper bounds.
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Fig. 4. Distance from the NE for Algorithm 2, on a time-varying digraph.
Since the networks are sparse, Theorem 2 ensures convergence only for
small step sizes (γ = 5 ∗ 10−4, τ = 3 ∗ 10−4), and convergence is
slow (solid line). However, the bounds are conservative: the iteration still
converges with τ 1000 times larger than the theoretical value (dashed line).
monotone. Our algorithm proved much faster than the ex-
isting gradient-based methods, when the step sizes satisfy
their theoretical upper bounds. The extension to games with
coupling constraints is left as future research. It would be
also valuable to relax our uniform connectedness assumption,
i.e., allowing for jointly strongly connected directed graphs.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
We define the estimate consensus subspace E := {y ∈
R
Nn | y = 1N⊗y, y ∈ Rn} and its orthogonal complement
E⊥ = {y ∈ RNn | (1N ⊗ In)⊤y = 0n}. Thus, any
vector x ∈ RNn can be written as x = x‖ + x⊥, where
x‖ = projE(x) =
1
N
(1N1
⊤
N ⊗ In)x, x⊥ = projE⊥(x), and
x⊤
‖
x⊥ = 0. Also, we use the shorthand notation Fx and Fx
in place of F (x) and F (x). We recast the iteration in (7) as
xk+1 = projΩ(xˆ
k − αR⊤F xˆk), xˆk = Wkxk. (16)
Let x∗ be the unique NE of the game in (1), and x∗ =
1N ⊗ x∗. We recall that x∗ = projΩ(x∗ − αFx∗) by (2),
and then x∗ = projΩ(x∗−αR⊤Fx∗). Moreover, Wkx∗ =
(Wk ⊗ In)(1N ⊗ x∗) = 1N ⊗ x∗ = x∗; hence x∗ is a
fixed point for (16). Let xk = x ∈ RNn and xˆ = Wkx =
xˆ‖ + xˆ⊥ = 1N ⊗ xˆ‖ + xˆ⊥ ∈ RNn. Thus, it holds that
‖xk+1 − x∗‖2
= ‖proj
Ω
(xˆ− αR⊤F xˆ)− proj
Ω
(x∗ − αR⊤Fx∗)‖2
≤ ‖(xˆ− αR⊤F xˆ)− (x∗ − αR⊤Fx∗)‖2
= ‖xˆ‖ + xˆ⊥ − x∗ + αR⊤(−F xˆ+ Fx∗ + F xˆ‖ − F xˆ‖)‖2
= ‖xˆ‖ − x∗‖2 + ‖xˆ⊥‖2
+ α2‖R⊤(F xˆ− F xˆ‖ + F xˆ‖ − Fx∗)‖2
− 2α(xˆ‖ − x∗)⊤R⊤(F xˆ− F xˆ‖)
− 2α(xˆ‖ − x∗)⊤R⊤(F xˆ‖ − Fx∗)
− 2αxˆ⊤⊥R⊤(F xˆ− F xˆ‖)
− 2αxˆ⊤
⊥
R⊤(F xˆ‖ − Fx∗)
(17)
≤ ‖xˆ‖ − x∗‖2 + ‖xˆ⊥‖2 + α2(ℓ2‖xˆ⊥‖2 + ℓ
2
0
N
‖xˆ‖ − x∗‖2
+ 2ℓ0ℓ√
N
‖xˆ‖ − x∗‖‖xˆ⊥‖) + 2αℓ√
N
‖xˆ‖ − x∗‖‖xˆ⊥‖
− 2αµ
N
‖xˆ‖ − x∗‖2 + 2αℓ‖xˆ⊥‖2 + 2αℓ0√
N
‖xˆ⊥‖‖xˆ‖ − x∗‖,
where the first inequality follows by nonexpansiveness of the
projection ([22, Prop. 4.16]), and to bound the addends in
(17) we used, in the order:
• 3rd term: ‖R‖ = 1, Lipschitz continuity of F , and ‖Fxˆ‖−
Fx∗‖ = ‖F xˆ‖ − Fx∗‖ ≤ ℓ0‖xˆ‖ − x∗‖ = ℓ0√
N
‖xˆ‖ − x∗‖;
• 4th term: ‖R(1⊗(xˆ‖−x∗))‖ = ‖xˆ‖−x∗‖ = 1√
N
‖xˆ‖−x∗‖;
• 5th term: (xˆ‖−x∗)⊤R⊤(F xˆ‖−Fx∗) = (xˆ‖−x∗)⊤(F xˆ‖−
Fx∗) ≥ µ‖xˆ‖ − x∗‖2 = 1N ‖xˆ‖ − x∗‖2;
• 6th term: Lipschitz continuity of F ;
• 7th term: ‖F xˆ‖ − Fx∗‖ ≤ ℓ0√
N
‖xˆ‖ − x∗‖ as above.
Besides, for every x = x‖+x⊥ ∈ RNn and for all k ∈ N, it
holds that xˆ = Wkx = x‖+Wkx⊥, where Wkx⊥ ∈ E⊥, by
doubly stochasticity of Wk, and ‖xˆ⊥‖ = ‖Wkx⊥‖ ≤ σ¯‖x⊥‖
by (4) and properties of the Kronecker product. Therefore
we can finally write, for all k ∈ N, for all xk ∈ RNn,
‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 ≤
[‖xk‖ − x∗‖
‖xk
⊥
‖
]⊤
Mα
[‖xk‖ − x∗‖
‖xk
⊥
‖
]
≤ λmax(Mα)(‖xk‖ − x∗‖2 + ‖xk⊥‖2)
= λmax(Mα)‖xk − x∗‖2.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
Let x∗ be the unique NE of the game in (1), and x∗ =
1N⊗x∗. We recall that the null space null(Lk) = E = {y ∈
R
Nn | y = 1N ⊗ y, y ∈ Rn} by Standing Assumption 3.
Therefore, Lkx
∗ = 0N and x∗ is a fixed point of the
iteration in (13) by (2). With F ka as in (14), for all k ∈ N,
for any x ∈ RNn, it holds that (x−x∗)⊤(F ka x−F ka x∗) =
(x − x∗)⊤γR⊤(Fx − Fx∗) + (x − x∗)⊤Lk(x − x∗) =
(x−x∗)⊤γR⊤(Fx−Fx∗)+(x−x∗)⊤L˜k(x−x∗), where
L˜k = (Lk+L
⊤
k )/2 = (Lk+L
⊤
k )⊗In/2 = L˜k⊗In, and L˜k is
the Laplacian of a connected graph (see IV) and λ2(L˜k) > λ¯
by Assumption 4. Therefore we can apply [15, Lemma 3]
to conclude that (x− x∗)⊤(F ka x− F ka x∗) ≥ µ¯‖x− x∗‖2,
with µ¯ > 0 as in (15). Also, F ka is Lipschitz continuous with
constant ℓ¯ = ℓ+ σ˜, σ˜ as in Assumption 4. Therefore we have
‖xk+1 − x∗‖2
= ‖projΩ(xk − τF ka (xk))− projΩ
(
x∗ − τF ka x∗)‖2
≤ ‖(xk − τF ka xk)− (x∗ − τF ka x∗)‖2
= ‖xk − x∗‖2 − 2τ(xk − x∗)⊤(F ka xk − F ka x∗)
+ τ2‖F ka xk − F ka x∗‖2
≤ (1− 2τµ¯+ τ2(ℓ+ σ˜)2)‖xk − x∗‖2 = ργ,τ‖xk − x∗‖2,
where in the first inequality we used [22, Prop. 4.16], and
ργ,τ ∈ (0, 1) if τ is chosen as in Theorem 2.
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